In this paper I argue that our theories of urban and regional planning have been deficient, neglecting to account properly for its regressive and oppressive functions. A new theory which addresses these functions should reconceptualise planning as an integral arm of the nation-state apparatus which tends to advance two parallel goals: economic growth and ethno-national identity. These goals represent projects driven by elites, for whom urban and regional planning provides an important mechanism of oppression and control, exercised both on state-wide and urban scales.
outcomes. This 'ascending' approach (Foucault, 1980: 99) is adopted by our present inquiry and thus requires the analyst to 'step-out' of both professional rhetoric and conventional planning texts (Huxley, per. com) . For that end, concepts from political science and political geography are used later in the paper to assist the analysis of planning as part of a state-space-society nexus of power relations.
PLANNING AND SOCIAL CONTROL: THEORETICAL OBSERVATIONS

Planning: Reform or Control?
It is conventional knowledge that urban and regional planning, as an organised field of human activity, emerged out of the unacceptable and inhumane living conditions prevalent in the rapidly expanding industrial cities of the 18th and 19th Centuries. The emergence of planning was intimately linked to a broader reform movement, which sought to redress the ills of unconstrained capitalism, through changes to the politics, economy and geography of cities (Cherry, 1988; Hall, 1988; Schaffer, 1988) .
While early planning thinkers (like later ones) were clearly divided along ideological lines, a discernible agreement underlay the development of planning thought and the emergence of the planning profession: planning should, first and foremost, act to improve people's (mainly physical) living conditions. This basic assumption formed the foundation for theories and tools which were later developed to guide public intervention in the land development process, and for the discourse developed by the profession. Most of the theories and concepts developed in planning during subsequent decades focused on two key questions: what is a good city/region? what is good planning? (see Cherry, 1988; Hall, 1988; Schaffer, 1988; Sorensen and Auster, 1990; Yiftachel, 1989 Yiftachel, , 1995 .
Recent studies on the performance of planning systems clearly attest to this pervasive perception of 'planning as reform'. Pearce (1992) and Healey (1992) , for example, examine the historical performance of the British planning system by using as yardsticks the progressive concepts of amenity, order, efficiency, distributive justice and environmental protection. The recent evaluative works of Burgess (1993) , Cherry (1988) , and Carmon (1990) also assess planning according to its ability to deliver improvement to the lives of subject populations. Even the thoroughly reflective work of Friedmann (1987) delineates four main perspectives which have dominated the development of planning theories and concepts: social reform, policy analysis, social learning and social mobilisation. These four concepts --beyond their many differences --share a common denominator of planning as an agent of 'positive' change.
Later reflections on the role and effectiveness of planning have generally continued to treat planning as a potential force of reform, and planners as 'do-gooders' who are often frustrated by 'external' political and economic forces. A most striking example of that was the 1994 debate on the pages of the journal Town Planning Review (Vol. 65, No. 3) where the two main views were represented. On the one hand, Cullingworth (1994) and Ravetz (1994) bemoan the inability and weakness of the British planning system to respond to societal problems, while on the other, Hall (1994) and Cherry (1994) find various fields in which the planning system did deliver a clear 'public good', thereby benefiting large segments of society. Thus, both sides viewed planning uncritically as part and parcel of the reform and improvement of society. The differences were only in the degree to which it managed to deliver its declared goals. I suggest that the TPR debate is representative of the pervasive --and at times distorted --understanding of planning among practitioners and theorists.
Writing the Rationale for Planning: An Idealistic (Self) Denial?
Reviewing the voluminous historical and conceptual literature which describes and explains the emergence of planning as an organised field of knowledge and practice paints a similarly narrow (and self-congratulating) picture to the one portrayed by the analysts of planning activity. Why has planning come about? What are the reasons for the popularity and wide adoption of urban and regional planning in most of the world's political units? The literature offers several main accounts, which can be summarised into the equity, efficiency and rationality perspectives.
In the first account we are told, from the equity perspective, that planning emerged due to the tireless work of social utopians and reformers, socially-oriented activists, anti-state anarchists and general 'do-gooders' (see : Bruton, 1974; Burgess, 1993; Cherry, 1988; Friedmann, 1987) . We are also told that planning assists in fighting for the socially disadvantaged (Davidoff, 1973) , and promotes an open, accessible and democratic public discourse (Forester and Krumholtz, 1990; Healey, 1992) . Second, and perhaps most prominently, we are told that planning offers a most efficient way of overcoming market failures by providing public goods, internalising externalities, maximising economic growth, facilitating capital accumulation, coordinating development, and minimising transaction costs (Alexander, 1992; Chapin, 1965; Hall, 1975 Hall, , 1988 . In the third account we are also told that urban and regional planning offers a most rational and strategic way for public decision-making about spatial, environmental and urban change, and that planners are characterised by their effective tools of methods for organising collective decisions (Alexander, 1996; Faludi, 1983) . There is of course a fourth more critical account, on which we will elaborate later.
As mentioned above, these main accounts are all characterised, to varying degrees, by a perception of planning as an activity devised to reform and improve cities, regions and society. I argue here that this view of planning is narrow, too idealistic and often unrealistic. Theoretically, it has ignored the position of planning as an arm of the modern nation-state, and empirically it has overlooked the numerous instances in which planning functions as a form of deliberate social control and oppression exercised by elites over weaker groups.
Because this is mainly a theoretical paper, it is not intended to offer detailed empirical backing for my contention. Suffice it is to mention briefly a few examples documented in a growing number of case study analyses. These have exposed the regressive and oppressive impacts of spatial policies such as public housing, inner city development, gentrification, the location of employment centers and environmental hazards or freeways. The regressive aspect of these policies often appears along a range of ethnic, racial, class, gender and sexuality cleavages.
To illustrate, racial, ethnic and national minorities have often been subject to discriminating spatial policies, resulting in ghettoisation and disempowerment. June Thomas (1995) and Huw Thomas (1994) analyse the impact of urban policies on British and American blacks, respectively, and show convincingly how housing, zoning and development policies have systematically excluded and/or distanced blacks from the opportunity and wealth in both countries. The frequent segregation of blacks in the two societies also meant that the development of their collective identity progressed in clear distinction to the dominant white groups, spawning a process of coterminous class-racial marginalisation (see also : Massey and Denton, 1993; Smith, 1989) . Jacobs (1996) adds examples from Australia, where the regulation of space and development in Perth and Brisbane is shown to exclude, marginalise, ignore or silence the persistent attempts of Aborigines to maintain some control over their previous living spaces and sacred places.
As Arasaratnam (1987) and Yiftachel (1992 Yiftachel ( , 1996 show the oppressive impact of spatial policies have been strongly evident in ethnically-dominated 'homeland states' (elsewhere termed 'ethnocracies', Yiftachel, 1997) embroiled in inter-ethnic conflicts. In such states, even when governed by formal democratic regimes, territory becomes a key group resource, for asserting ethnic control, collective identity and economic superiority. Governments in such states have used their planning powers to manipulate ethnic spatial relations in an attempt to protect the dominant ethnic group from peripheral challenge. Arasaratnam (1987) shows how land reclamation, agricultural development and settlement programs in Sri Lanka's central and eastern regions have systematically favor the Sinhalese, at the expense of the Tamil residents of these regions. Likewise, Yiftachel (1996) demonstrates the profoundly regressive impact of Israel's regional development and settlement policies, which have rapidly shifted land and economic resources from Palestinians to Jews.
A large volume of studies has also documented the privileged position of the rich, and the deepening deprivation of the poor caused by urban and regional policies. David Harvey's groundbreaking work (1973, 1985) , based mainly on structural analyses of American and British cities, has shown how the modern capitalist state in general, and urban planning in particular, are embedded in the facilitation of capital accumulation, and therefore in the repeated reproduction of class inequalities. This was reinforced by the influential works of other marxist scholars, including Dear and Scott (1981) , Foglesong (1986) and Scott (1980) . Peter Marcuse's analysis (1978 Marcuse's analysis ( , 1986 of American urban renewal and housing policies has also clearly shown the use of spatial public policies to control, contain and deprive the poor and shift material and political resources to the wealthy. Another illustration of this process was presented by McLoughlin's (1992) comprehensive study of the planning of Melbourne, Australia where he demonstrated how post-war policies tended to deepen area-baseddisparities. This effect was achieved by both regional planning policies with their emphasis on creating appropriate conditions for investment, and by local planning which tended to improve townscape and facilities in areas already inhabited by wealthy and influential groups. Mcloughlin found little evidence of planners or other 'built environment professionals' strategising or acting in pursuit of equity of social justice goals.
Additional examples for the potentially regressive influence of planning can be brought from studies of gender relations and sexuality in the built environment. As shown by a host of writers (including Little, 1993; Kenny, 1995; Sandercock, 1995; Sandercock and Forsyth, 1992; Wilson, 1991; Wajcman, 1991; Weisman, 1994) , planning policies have been generally dominated by male interests and heterosexual values, and have been identified as a major factor in the continuing discrimination experienced by women and homosexual communities. Systematic critiques of the 'man-made' environment is provided by Wajcman (1991) and Weisman (1994) who examine both the design process and physical realities of American, Australian and European cities. They establish a clear association between the built environment and the patriarchal order, expectations, assumption and hierarchies of modern society. These analyses examine the production of space on all scales, ranging from the home, through the street, the neighbourhood, the suburb and the city. On all scales, these studies conclude, the design of the modern city and its housing are organised in men's interests to the detriment of women, who have been expected to assume a subordinate and domestic role in economic and political life. Women are therefore disadvantaged, excluded, feared, controlled or ignored, and are rarely accommodated fully by shapers of the built environment.
These brief forays into the empirical literature clearly show that the phenomenon of 'planning as oppression' does exist in a variety of settings, affecting a range of social relations in space. Urban and regional planning can thus perceived, at least partially, as 'spatial police' (Sandercock, 1995: 29) , structurally embedded in the ever-present reality of oppression experienced by marginal social groups (see Young, 1990 for an excellent discussion on social oppression). It is also noteworthy that the oppressive aspect of planning exists, as noted above, in most parts of the world, including in societies whose self-image is enlightened and democratic, such as the USA, Britain and Australia. This vivid reality has spurred a group of scholars to provide critical accounts of planning, to which we now turn.
Previous Critical Perspectives
As clear from the above, the dominant reformist-benevolent interpretation of planning is not universal. Contrasting accounts do exist, particularly --but not exclusively --from marxist, feminist and racial perspectives (see, for example: Davidoff, 1973; Dear and Scott, 1981; Hague, 1984; Harvey, 1992; Little, 1993; Marcuse, 1978) . However, even those explaining planning as assisting the domination of powerful interests, observe that planners and politicians have shared a utilitarian belief in its contribution for a 'better society', through development which wouldif properly planned -maximise benefits for the largest number of people (Huxley, 1994) . The main argument of such critics has mainly focused on planning's unintentional (or implicit) regressive consequences, or the ability of powerful narrow interests to manipulate planning and planners. It is my intention here to develop the understanding of 'planning as social control' beyond these early attempts. In this context we should briefly note two recent critical perspectives which have already began to couch planning in broader societal terms.
The first derives from the influential writings of Michel Foucault, which spurred a group of scholars to link urban and regional planning to the wider notion of power and domination in modern society. Foucault saw the transition to modernity as being governed by ever-more-refined methods of social control. States and elites, which had previously coerced their will by physical and legal means, were gradually finding ways to maintain people's compliance and submission by accumulating and manipulating information about their subjects. This enabled the infusion of disciplinary control through education, public institutions, the shaping of the public discourse and the production of a controllable residential order, in what has been widely described as the 'power-knowledge process'.
A thorough discussion of the impact of Foucauldian thinking on the analysis of urban and regional planning warrants another full paper, but the works of Allen (1996 ), Boyer (1983 , Huxley (1994) and Lewi and Wickham (1996) should be mentioned, as paving the way to a Foucauldian understanding of planning as fundamentally concerned with controlling, manipulating ruling and oppressing. They have shown how urban governmentability was achieved through the infusion of societal concepts such as normalisation, surveillance, and the construction of 'population' as a meaningful entity to be studied --often in the name of elite and state interests to control the rapidly modernising and growing city.
The second recent attempt to critically analyse the oppressive capacity of planning derive from the writings of scholars in the 'regime' and 'regulation' schools which link changes in the prevailing political-economic structures to the regulation and development of space. Regime theories have mainly emerged from the USA, where urban governance has been portrayed as a 'growth machine' (Logan and Molotch, 1987) , and where more recent studies (such as Fainstein, 1995; Wilson, 1995) have documented the constant realignment of electoral coalitions and governing policies to achieve a 'market edge' in the ever-intensifying race between cities to capture 'footloose capital'. City governments thus employ planning (in the form of land regulations, control over buildings, location and cost of infrastructure and amenity of residential environments) as a central means with which capital and 'desirable' residents can be attracted. This process typifies the 'new urban politics', but pays only scant attention to the needs and aspirations of the lion share of urban residents (see also: Lauria, 1997; Wilson, 1995) .
The regulation school, which has mainly emerged from the U.K., places planning and the production of space as part of an ever-changing mode of societal regulation necessary to shore-up (as well as continuously change) a fundamentally exploitive capitalist mode of production. The regulation school focuses on the legal, social and institutional setting as central to the survival of capitalism. It is argued that the institutional infrastructure of western societies, and particularly the emerging post-Fordist mode of regulation, is critical to the 'absorption' of the contradiction and crises of capitalism (such as unemployment, growing inequalities, housing shortage and welfare erosion). Within this broad framework, the regulation of the built environment is essential, often allowing capital to regenerate a profit basis and contain or divert the grievance of affected communities (Berry and Huxley, 1992; Jessop, 1995; Feldman, 1995; Lauria and Whelan, 1995) . Urban and regional planning is thus an important element in the institutional setting which mediates the circulation of both capital and people's daily lives, and is therefore part-and-parcel of the evolving mode of regulation.
These illuminating critical perspectives form a foundation for my reconceptualisation of planning. I intend to build on these perspectives as well as on other recent critical analyses (see : Baum, 1996; Flyvbjerg, 1996; Huxley, 1994; McLoughlin, 1994; Sandercock, 1995; Yiftachel, 1994) . In the pages below I will attempt to offer a 'deeper' historical and structural framework which could explain the emergence and character of planning, linking it to recent social science thinking about the state and its supporting apparatu.
Reconceptualising Planning: State, Space and the Dialectical Tension between Reform and Control
In order to create a more comprehensive and realistic conceptualisation of the rise and function of urban and regional planning I propose to understand it as intimately linked to the logic of the modern nation-state and its constant endeavour to control the production of space within its boundaries --in regions as well as cities. While the debate over the nature of modern nation-states is still contested, it has been widely observed that they have served two main purposes: (a) organise and facilitate capital accumulation within a capitalist world-economy; and (b) mould, enhance and reproduce ethno-national collective identities (Anderson, 1991; Taylor, 1994) . We are all aware that planning in the public domain emerged historically as a consequence of the rise of nation-states, and received its legitimacy and essential statutory empowerment from the state's legislature and judiciary (Friedmann, 1987) . However, we need to delve deeper into the structure of nation-states to find clues to the nature of planning as an agent of social control. For that task I have drawn on the insightful accounts of the nation-state offered by three contemporary thinkers in the social sciences: Peter Taylor, Anthony Mitchell and Benedict Anderson, and later link their work the problems of governing the modern city. Taylor (1994) , a political geographer, convincingly advances a territorial 'container' model for the modern nation-state. He argues that the modern state has evolved from previous (and more spatially 'porous') political arrangements with an unprecedented ability to contain power, wealth, social relations and cultures within defined territories. This unprecedented power derives from the hegemonic nature of 'absolute state territoriality' enjoyed by modern nation-states. However, Taylor shows that this spatial power structure is not a 'natural' historical progression. It advances the interests and aspirations of certain social elites, by being a most suitable political-cultural unit for facilitating a globalising world-order, from which these elites benefit --often at the expense of others. The state apparatus thus becomes a tool for social oppression on behalf of these elites, assisting to maintain the power, wealth, social hierarchy and cultural hegemony of social elites, within a well-controlled territorial unit. Given this spatial-political interpretation, we can see how a prime instrument of spatial policy --urban and regional planning --can be introduced to further the interests of powerful groups, by assisting to create or reproduce uneven social relations, within the tightly closed territorial container. Mitchell (1991) , a historian and political scientist, presents a complementary account to Taylor's container analogy by examining the workings of the state apparatus as an organisation posited both 'opposite and within society'. Contrary to traditional approaches which perceive the state as an autonomous body, independent of society and markets (see : Held, 1983 ), Mitchell convincingly argues that the 'state' is a social construction whose 'boundaries' with society ebb and flow, expand and contract, according to particular interests in specific times and places. The state is therefore the creation of powerful social interests which mould it in their shape, so we need to realise that 'the apparent boundary of the state does not mark the limit of the social processes of regulation; it is itself a product of those processes.' (Mitchell, 1991: 90) . In other words, the state was not created to 'intervene in society' on behalf of benevolent ideals; rather society (or powerful sections within) created the state and erected boundaries around its institutions which ostensibly present the state as neutral and autonomous. Clearly, this account runs in the face of the conventional wisdom of planning (or other areas of public policy for that matter) as a form of benevolent state intervention.
Mitchell's unpacking of the intimate links between states and societies presents another Literature, Vol. 12, No. 2. pp: 395-406. 1998 dimension of social control. Using the Foucauldian notion of disciplinary power (Foucault, 1977) , Mitchell illustrates how the blurred boundaries between institutions, their members and the 'public' work to diffuse and expand the norms and logic of institutions. Internal institutional norms are thus exerted over members who internalise and reproduce these norms through their societal and familial networks. According to this account, the modern state has reworked the organisational foundation of society. By dividing space, ordering surveillance and breaking down complex tasks into routine procedures, the state has perfected the 'technology of power' and created an omnipresent diffusion of state control. Combining Taylor's political-geographical understanding and Mitchell's organisational analysis enables us to place planning in its realistic societal position. Since planning was indeed sanctioned, empowered and implemented by the state, and since the state is a social construction aimed (at least partially) at imposing social control by elites, we can see that the very emergence of institutional planning is closely linked to serving specific elite interests. These interests are embedded in the state as a spatial container of power and wealth, and in the web of institutions which diffuse disciplinary power into a wide range of social practices.
Journal of Planning
We must of course also recognise that nation-states may be arenas of emancipatory action. As noted by Giddens (1985 Giddens ( , 1991 and Hobsbawm (1990) the emergence of modern nation-states has heralded a gradual but profound shift in power structures from absolute authorities (such as churches and monarchies) to elected governments. However, the emancipatory capacity of modernisation and state formation --important as it is --is conventional wisdom, and has already been widely recognised by planning theorists (see : Forester, 1993; Friedmann, 1992; Hall, 1988) . What is important to stress here is the double-edged nature of the state, as a set of institutions able to affect both regressive or progressive social change. The formulation of public policies in general, and planning policies in particular, should thus be viewed as a dialectical process, shaped and constantly reshaped by the on-going tension between the forces of oppression and reform. This dialectical process has often been ignored by planning theorists, who tend to overlook the oppressive aspect, thereby literally keeping planning's dark-side 'in the dark'.
Returning to the link between planning and the nation-state phenomenon, we should highlight the second central element in contemporary nation-states which has been almost totally neglected by planning thought and theory: the construction of collective identities. In that context we should recognise that the transformation heralded by the advent of nation-states as a ruling world-order clearly influenced, and was influenced by, a profound change in group affiliations and cultural bonds. This has been reflected in the aims of the all-powerful social movement of nationalism (Anderson, 1991; Taylor, 1994) .
There has been a rich debate on the link between nationalism, state-formation and ethnic identities in the social sciences and the humanities (see Smith, 1995 for a sweeping review). Suffice it is to say here that the legitimacy (and many problems) of contemporary nation-states largely derive from their ability to chrystallise collective ethno-national identities as a foundation of their political and social institutions and legitimacy. Here we can draw on Benedict Anderson (1991, a political sociologist, who shows us in his oft-quoted work how this legitimacy is achieved by a continuous process of collective 'imagining'. The 'imagining' process sees the elevation and adoption of certain beliefs and myths about a group's common territory, past and future. These beliefs then work to construct --through education, place-making, art, official rhetoric and popular discourse --a unifying national identity (Anders, 1991). As Anderson clearly shows, the imagining process is embedded with elements of social control, and is essentially driven by particular social, ethnic and economic elites.
In the context of urban and regional planning, we should note that the processes of state-building --which entails the establishment of institutions including a planning system --often draws its internal and international legitimacy from an all encompassing and hegemonic national ideology. This means that state-building projects are intimately linked with nation-building, and the construction of collective identities. Therefore states, which initiate and implement planning policies, are active actors in the process of ethnic and cultural 'imagining'. Needless to say, this is never a neutral or consensual process, but rather a project dominated by core ethnic or social groups often at the expense of peripheral groups and cultures (Anderson, 1991; Billig, 1995; Taylor, 1994) .
Finally, it is necessary to link our understanding of planning as part-and-parcel of the modern (and postmodern) nation-state to the exigencies of urban government. Urbanisation has of course been a hallmark of the modern industrial order, bringing with it massive social, spatial and political changes. Scholars such as Max Weber (1921) , Earnest Gellner (1983) and Anthony Giddens (1985) have described and analysed in depth the intimate, reciprocal and mutually reinforcing links between modernisation, urbanisation and the rise of contemporary forms of governance and control. A critical point in the process of urbanisation has been the breakdown of previous systems of social authority, hierarchy and control. Industrialisation and urban migration destroyed the agrarian spatial order on which much of the religious and political system of social control rested in the pre-modern era. In addition, as pointed out by Weber (1921) , migrants to modern cities became 'individuals' in sharp contrast to their previous 'immutable' clan, class or group affiliations. This opened a multitude of revolutionary political possibilities, and indeed the roots of democracy and social reform can generally be traced to urban political movements (Weber, 1921) .
The combination of a collapsing social structure, a new political order, as well as the relatively rapid concentration of the masses in dense cities clearly posed a profound threat to established economic, social, cultural and gender relations. Boyer (1983) and Wilson (1991) demonstrate the depth of fear among the upper classes and policy makers of the potential unruliness of the masses, women or minorities which could be unleashed in the new urban (dis)order. It is in that context that the state (on behalf of its elites) starts to assert its power in the shaping and controlling of urban spaces and development. The control of cities thus became an integral part of an increasingly efficient, yet subtle, system of disciplinary control (Lewi and Wickham, 1996) In principles, then, the control of national and/or urban space form part of the same process of transformation from the pre-modern to the modern. During this transitional phase, states developed increasingly powerful planning mechanisms in order to control, contain, oppress and marginalise elements which could destabilise a prevailing capitalist, national and male dominated orders. Clearly, and as effectively shown by Wilson (1991) , the efforts to control have often been frustrated by unpredictable social consequences. The main point of this paper, however, is not to evaluate the efficacy of planning as a system of control, but to illuminate the embedded nature of social control in the very emergence, institutionalisation and practice of urban and regional planning.
Planning Control: Paradox, Resistance and Compliance
The above conceptualisation of planning as an arm of an apparatus of social control gives rise to a paradox: the very same tools ostensibly introduced to assist social reform and improvement in people's quality of life, may be used as a means of controlling and repressing peripheral groups. As noted, this has been highly pronounced in ethnically divided societies, where one dominant ethnic group controls the state and often uses the power of 'public' institutions to impose its control over other ethnic groups. Urban and regional planning is a central tool in imposing this control, given the critical importance of land and territorial control to ethnic identity and politics (Yiftachel, 1991) . However, the tendency of planning policy to marginalise and oppress the 'other' has been evident in all types of societies, but planners have shied away from thoroughly examining this problem. A typical planning response to the problem was outlined by Thomas and Krishnarayan (1993: 17) who claim that 'a positive approach to racial and ethnic equality in planning follows from taking planning principles and good professional practice seriously.'
Yet the issue goes beyond the ethical and professional aspects of planning and planners. It is directly linked to a structural understanding of the relations between the state, social peripheries and space. Understanding the state-social relations-space nexus is likely to lead us to examine the political consequences of discriminatory and exclusionary policies which may generate popular resistance and the exacerbation of tensions and conflict. Clearly, the careful examination and generalisation of policy consequences --however messy or ugly --must become an integral part of planning theory. This is not the place to discuss in detail the complex and non-linear issue of resistance 'from below' to control imposed 'from above'. In our reforumulated understanding of planning we should, instead, recognise that certain planning control policies, particularly those imposed on 'homeland' ethnic minorities are likely to face growing resistance, as has been the case in most post-colonial societies (Yiftachel, 1992) . However, other policies of control, especially when based on more subtle and malleable social boundaries (such as class, gender or locality) may face little resistance, as the lower strata in society often reluctantly accept the hegemonic capitalist, national and patriarchal social order. These groups tend to quietly comply with the oppressive 'rules of the game' (Marcuse, 1994) . A realistic understanding of planning acknowledges the possibility of spatial control policies triggering either resistance or compliance, or any combination thereof, depending on the specific set of spatial and temporal circumstances. Figure 1 illustrates the revised conceptual framework of planning which emerges from the above discussion. It draws on the state as the foundation of planning's legitimation and power and portrays the potentially dialectical nature of planning --being shaped by the on-going tension between reform and control, and triggering reactions stretching from compliance to resistance. This framework also highlights four dimensions for the understanding of planning-society relations, to which we now turn.
The Four Dimensions of Planning Control
Given the position of planning as a public decision-making arena sanctioned by the state, we delineated four key areas of planning control, as illustrated by Figure 1 . These dimensions derive from Taylor's (1994) 'container' model of the territorial state (where he defines it as a 'container' of power, wealth, social relations and culture), from Anderson's (1991) insights of the link between nation-and state-building and ethno-cultural dominance, and from Mitchell's (1991) illustration of the covert links between state elites and society.
I suggested here that the practices of urban and regional planning as social control can be usefully theorised and studied by examining four dimensions of planning policy: territorial, procedural, socioeconomic and cultural. These dimensions embody the most critical aspects of planning as an organised field of policy and professional practice: its spatial content (the territorial dimension); its power relations and decision-making processes (the procedural dime); its long-term material consequences (the socioeconomic dimension) and its repercussions to our identities and 'ways of life and thinking' (the cultural dimension). Let us define these dimensions of planning more precisely and elaborate on the potential of each to affect social control.
(a) The Territorial dimension is expressed by the pattern of (inter-group) land control caused by plans and policies. Land control may of course be influenced by land ownership, but also by the location of settlements, urban expansion and land use zoning. The territorial dimension of planning also includes the demarcation of administrative boundaries, according to which land use, development, and the provision of facilities and services are usually determined. Territorial policies can be used as a most powerful tool of control over weaker groups and minorities, particularly in deeply divided societies, where ethnic groups often reside in 'their own' regions.
Planning can be used in such contexts to contain the territorial expression of such minorities, typically by imposing restrictions on minority land ownership, restricting the expansion of minority settlements, and settling members of the majority group within the minority region for control and surveillance. This is believed to impede the emergence of a powerful, regionally based, counter-culture, which may challenge the social and political order espoused by the central (majority controlled) state (Mikessel and Murphy, 1991; Williams, 1985; Yiftachel, 1992) . On an urban scale, too, majority-controlled authorities can exercise forms of planning control, through land use and housing policies, with the effect of creating segregation between social groups, usually according to class, race and/or ethnicity (Eyles, 1990; Smith, 1989) . This process is elsewhere described as the recreation of walled cities, in which patterns of domination are expressed by physical division and spatial fragmentation (Marcuse, 1994) . The imposition of complex, inconsistent and unstable administrative boundaries can also function as a powerful tool of control, as ordinary citizens may encounter difficulties in dealing with such systems, which are usually more familiar to the wealthy and the powerful.
(b) The Procedural Dimension covers the formulation and implementation processes of plans and policies. Here planning can directly affect power relations in society by controlling access to the 'communicative infrastructure' and decision-making processes (Forester, 1993) . The procedural dimension includes statutory aspects which formally determine the relationship between various authorities and the public, and less formal aspects such as the rate of public participation, information accessibility, consultation and negotiation in policy-making, and the on-going relations between authorities and communities.
Within that dimension, planning processes can be used for the exclusion of various segments and groups from meaningful participation in decision-making, thereby contributing to their marginalisation and repression. This form of control can be explicit, as in the case of decisions imposed 'from above' or implicit, through sophisticated methods of information distortion and meaningless forms of public consultations (Forester and Krumbholtz, 1990; Friedmann, 1992; Hillier, 1992) .
(c) The Socioeconomic Dimension manifests as the long-term impact of planning on social and economic relations in society. Bound with the concept of 'planning externalities', land use changes result in (usually indirect) positive or negative impacts on neighbouring people or communities. That impact, which may include consequences such as improved accessibility, or proximity to environmental nuisance, forms an integral part of people's real income, whether it can or cannot be directly expressed in monetary terms. In that way, resources may shift between societal groups in what Harvey (1973: 100) termed 'the quiet redistributive mechanism of land use planning' . Therefore, planning can be used as a tool of socioeconomic control and domination by helping to maintain and even widen socioeconomic gaps through the location of development costs and benefits in accordance with the interests of dominant groups (McLoughlin, 1992) . The systematic deprivation of subordinate groups by spatial policies often results in a growing level of dependence of weaker groups. This dependence, in turn, forms another powerful tool of socioeconomic control (Friedmann, 1992; Harvey, 1992) .
(d) The Cultural Dimension includes the impact of planning on the various cultures and collective identities which exist within city and state. As we have seen, a central component of the nation-state order is the development, maintenance and reproduction of national and ethnic identities. To that end, ethnonational groups usually undergo a process of collective 'imagining', through which feelings of bondage and belonging are fostered, through socially constructed belief in a common past, place and destination (Anderson, 1991) . However, this homogenising process usually privileges the central 'core' culture, often at the expense of peripheral or alternative ways of life, thereby forming another --and usually more subtle --form of social and ethnic control (Billig, 1995) . This is evident on both national and urban scales, and has recently become a central issue in many multi-ethnic cities, where minorities attempt to claim 'insurgent' public spaces (Sandercock, 1995: 25) , but face opposition from the established core groups.
It is quite clear that urban and regional planning and development can have an important effect on this oppressive and homogenising process, by creating settlement patterns, dispersing or concentrating certain populations, placing communal, religious or ethnic facilities, housing and services in particular places, and governing the character and norms of urban public spaces. Planning is therefore part and parcel of the nation-state's strategy of space production, which is central to shaping and reshaping of ethnic and cultural identities (Jackson and Penrose, 1993; Penrose, 1996) . Here again, planning can have progressive or oppressive consequences. On the one hand, social and cultural elites can insist on forcefully homogenising the entire national space, by imposing their version of a desired physical and cultural landscape. On the other, planning can be pluralistic and respect the legitimacy and autonomy of peripheral cultures. However, the process of nation-and state-building --of which planning is an integral part --is usually dominated by a central ethnic culture, which often works to repress, alienate and delegitimise peripheral ethnic cultures and identities.
These four dimensions may, of course, not exhaust the mechanisms through which planning can impose social control. The dimensions are neither independent of one another, and will tend to wax and wane in specific circumstances. For example, in well-established liberal-democracies, such as the USA or Australia, the socioeconomic dimension of control will probably dominate, while in 'homeland ethnic states', such as Sri Lanka, Slovakia or Israel, the ethno-cultural and territorial dimensions are likely to be pronounced. It is however, essential for our understanding of urban and regional planning to discern the full range of policy areas in which planning may impact adversely on groups within society.
A Concluding Note: Widening Our (Narrow) Explorations of Planning
In the foregoing I have attempted to show that as planning theorists we must rethink our conceptualisation of urban and regional planning by exploring more seriously its 'dark side'. This will broaden our understanding of planning as a double-edged activity with a potential to act regressively or progressively, using similar principles and tools. This alternative view derives from linking planning to the state apparatus from which it derives its legitimacy and power. Drawing on the epistemological approach offered by Michel Foucault (1980) , and on the recent works of Taylor (199) , Mitchell (1991) and Anderson (1991) , I have argued that the modern state often advances the interests of social elites and dominant groups, at the expense of weaker groups.
Therefore --and contrary to conventional wisdom --urban and regional planning is not just an arm of government which may or may not contribute to societal progress and reform, but also has the potential for oppressing subordinate groups. Social control can of course appear in a variety of ways, some of them totally benign, and can be a useful instrument for the preservation of public rule and order (Faludi, 1983) . However, the evident link between urban and regional planning and the 'dark side' of oppressing minority, gender and peripheral groups has rarely been aired in the planning discourse, let alone theorised properly. I have shown above that this oppression can be exercised through the four main dimensions of planning: territorial (affecting containment, surveillance and segregation), procedural (exclusion and marginalisation), socioeconomic (deprivation and dependence), and cultural (homgenisation, alienation and delegitimation). Planning can therefore facilitate elite domination and control of four key societal resources: space, power, wealth and identity.
It should be reiterated that the regressive consequences of planning can often occur despite planners' positive intentions, given the 'frameworks of power' which manipulate and reshape policy outcomes (McLoughlin, 1992) . We should also remember that although planning theories often deal with visionary and normative prescriptions, they still usually rest on a questionable benign perception planning. As shown above, this perception is incomplete and is often misleading.
Exposing the 'sinister' aspects of planning is of course not entirely novel. As mentioned, ground-breaking scholarly works have shown how planning has served and facilitated the strategies of dominant interests. These works have mainly come from marxist, feminist, racial and environmental perspectives (see : Hague, 1984; Harvey, 1973 Harvey, , 1992 Huxley, 1994; Marcuse, 1978 Marcuse, , 1994 McLoughlin, 1992; Little, 1993; Pearce, 1992; Sandercock, 1995; Sandercock and Forsyth, 1992; Thomas, 1994; Yiftachel, 1991 Yiftachel, , 1995 .
Here I have attempted to advance the insights offered by previous critical studies in two main ways: (a) broaden the mainly sectoral understanding offered by previous accounts, and show that planning has the ability to affect social change in a wide range of societal dimensions; and (b) show not only that planning has been manipulated and used by powerful interests (like most previous studies) but that urban and regional planning --as an integral part of the nation-state --is structurally devised to exert control and oppression.
Why, then, have planning theorists refrained from critically examining this dark-side? Why is there a constant flow of planning texts glorifying the efforts of reformist and progressive planners, or assuming a-priori that planning is an agent of positive change? Why has so little been written about its sinister, oppressive or regressive dimensions? It may be possible to pin this myopia to the close association between planning theorists and the profession (Baum, 1996; Innes, 1995) . Both theorists and practitioners, so the argument goes, have a joint agenda of promoting planning, and both depend on the thriving of the practical endeavour of the practitioners. More specifically in academia, a view also exists that planning theorists were deeply frustrated by the intellectual and practical 'cul-de-sac' presented by grand marxist theories or by dogmatic rationalist models which had dominated the field in previous decades. Given the debilitating rivalry between the rationalist and marxist schools, several leading theorists have deliberately set out to inject practicality, energy, optimism and hope into the profession, by focusing on micro-politics, communication and by highlighting the positive impact that planners can make (see : Healey, 1996; Innes, 1995) .
These indeed are plausible explanations, but they also expose a somewhat distorted conception of theory and a paralysing link between academe and profession. I argue here that the intimate links between the planning profession and the academe have damaged both practice and theory, by burdening theoreticians with untenable expectations to produce 'applicable' theories, and by providing practitioners with partial and often misleading theories about the potential impact of planning on the built environment (see Mcloughlin, 1994) .
The association with 'the profession' has therefore made planning theory heavily oriented towards constructing normative and prescriptive models rather than pursuing analytical explanations. This is most clearly articulated by Mandelbaum (1996: xix) , who surveys recent development in planning theory and discerns a consensual orientation toward normative-pragmatic approaches, and a near total 'abandonment of the image of grand theoretical syntheses'. As such, we have witnessed a continuous outflow of normative and prescriptive work with a clear preference for agency over structure by the field's leading theorists (see Forester, 1993; Healey, 1992 Healey, , 1996 Innes, 1995) . This type of work, by its very nature, attempts to focus on micro-scale processes, and design 'better futures' and better ways of 'doing planning' (Healy, 1992) , rather than examine the systemic role, function and consequences of planning. Our understanding of the role and impact of planning in shaping our cities, states and social relations is therefore impeded by a lack of critical distance between theory and practice.
Further, I join Beauregard's (1995 ), McLoughlin's (1994 and Baum's (1996) observations about the inward-looking narrowness of planning theory and theorists. Beauregard's (1995: 163) comments on the double marginality of planning theorists, both within the profession and within the academy in general, and on its distance from the main bodies of social science research and discourse. Similarly, McLoughlin (1994 : 1111 acutely observes that 'town planners relegate urban political economy to the periphery and place town planning at the centre' to the detriment of a thorough understanding of 'how cities and regions work'. Baum (1996) goes further by contending that the collective amnesia of planning theorists is caused by the reality of planning being too painful to recognise and too risky to expose publicly. This causes theorists to deny the political (and often regressive) nature of planning policy to their students, professional 'subjects' and even to themselves. This 'naturally' leads to a retreat onto reassuring (but analytically weak) rational, technical or normative models (Baum, 1996: 374-375 ).
Yet this state of affairs need not dictate the future work of other planning theorists. Indeed, if recent theoretical work in various parts of the world is any indication, the dominance of partial normative theories may be challenged. Several promising theoretical explorations have recently started to examine critically the social control functions of planning and have began to enter into the planning theory discourse. If Innes (1995: 183) proclaims the emergence of a communicative and interactive-action paradigm of planning theory, we may also be witnessing the emergence of a new critical perspective. There is now a group of people who simultaneously work on the theoretical and empirical aspects of the planning, oppression and control. Exchanging views, and beginning to refer to each other's efforts, these scholars participate in a collective construction of a new body of knowledge.
Examples of such work include (among others): Margo Huxley's unpacking of the utilitarian foundations of modern planning; Bent Flyvbjerg's (1996) exposition of 'realrationalitat' which dominates 'real-world' planning politics; Howell Baum's (1996) work on theorists, politics and institutions; the late Brian McLoughlin's (1994) work on the 'Professionalisation and ideologically-driven blindness' of planning research and teaching' (p. 1113); Leonie Sandercock'(1995: 12) critique of 'time warped planning historiographies'; Micky Lauria's renewed political-economic analysis of planning (see: Lauria and Whelan, 1995; Lauria, 1997) , and Oren Yiftachel's (1992 Yiftachel's ( , 1994 Yiftachel's ( , 1995 work on planning as an agent of ethnic territorial and cultural domination in multi-ethnic societies. Many other scholars are working on similar themes, which have already been collected in some edited volumes, such as volumes 13 and 14 of the journal Planning Theory (the former edited by Leonie Sandercock, and the latter by Micky Lauria and Marshal Feledman), and Sophie Watson's and Kathy Gibson's two recent books (1994, 1995) Metropolis Now and Postmodern Cities and Spaces.
The agenda is thus clear: much more knowledge is needed on the association between spatial public policies and social oppression, domination and control. This is essential for the advancement of our theoretical and empirical knowledge, but will also assist practitioners, enabling them to draw lessons from examples and analyses of planning's negative aspects. Key issues for future studies may include the philosophical, political, economic and spatial circumstances in which planning emerges as an oppressive activity; the short-and long-term societal consequences of control policies (resistance? compliance?); the relative weight, importance and prominence of the four dimensions of control identified above; and the role of planners as professionals and citizens within the apparatus of control. More empirical case-studies and comparative examinations will help us advance toward some generalisations, and rejuvenate the discourse of planning theory. It is therefore time for theorists to broaden their explorations and venture beneath the long shadows of the discipline's 'dark side'.
